Abstract. The stable marriage problem is a classical matching problem introduced by Gale and Shapley. It is known that for any instance, there exists a solution, and there is a polynomial time algorithm to find one. However, the matching obtained by this algorithm is man-optimal, that is, the matching is favorable for men but unfavorable for women, (or, if we exchange the roles of men and women, the resulting matching is woman-optimal). The sex-equal stable marriage problem, posed by Gusfield and Irving, seeks a stable matching "fair" for both genders. Specifically it seeks a stable matching with the property that the sum of the men's scores is as close as possible to that of the women's. This problem is known to be strongly NP-hard.
Introduction
An instance I of the stable marriage problem consists of n men, n women, and each person's preference list. A preference list is a totally ordered list including all members of the opposite sex depending on his or her preferences. For a matching M between men and women, a pair of a man m and a woman w is called a blocking pair if both prefer each other to their current partners. A matching with no blocking pair is called stable. Gale and Shapley [1962] showed that every instance admits at least one stable matching, and proposed a linear time algorithm to find one, which is known as the Gale-Shapley algorithm. However, in general, there are many different stable matchings for a single instance, and the Gale-Shapley algorithm finds only one of them (man-optimal or woman-optimal) with an extreme property: in the man-optimal stable matching, each man is matched with his best possible partner, while each woman gets her worst possible partner, among all stable matchings. Hence, it is natural to try to obtain a matching which is not only stable but also "good" in some criterion.
There are three major optimization criteria for the quality of stable matchings. The minimum regret stable marriage problem (the minimum egalitarian stable marriage problem and the sex-equal stable marriage problem, respectively) is to find a stable matching M with minimum r (M) (c(M) and |d(M)|, respectively) [Gusfield and Irving 1989] . Note that the number of stable matchings for one instance grows exponentially in general (e.g., see Irving and Leather [1986] ). Nevertheless, for the first two problems, Gusfield [1987] and Irving et al. [1987] proposed O(n 2 ) and O(n 4 ) time algorithms, respectively, by exploiting a lattice structure which is of polynomial size but contains the information for all of the stable matchings. Later, Feder [1992 , 1994 improved the complexity of the algorithm for the minimum egalitarian stable marriage problem to O(n 3 ). In contrast, it is hard to obtain a sex-equal stable matching. The question of its complexity was posed by Gusfield and Irving [1989] , and was later proved to be strongly NP-hard by Kato [1993] . Thus, the next step should be its approximability, for which we have no knowledge so far.
1.1. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS. Algorithm A is said to be a c-approximation algorithm if A(I )/OPT (I ) ≤ c holds for any input I , where A(I ) and OPT (I ) are the costs of A's solution and an optimal solution, respectively. However, since the optimal cost of the sex-equal stable marriage problem can be zero, this measure cannot be used here. Instead, we consider finding near optimal solutions. Let M 0 and M z be the man-optimal and the woman-optimal stable matchings, respectively. Figure 1 ). Our goal is to obtain a stable matching M such that − ≤ d(M) ≤ for a given constant , where = min{|d(M 0 )|, |d(M z )|}. We define the following problem called Near SexEqual (NSE). Given a stable marriage instance I and a positive constant , it seeks a stable matching M such that |d(M)| ≤ if such M exists, or answers "None" otherwise. We give a polynomial time algorithm for NSE, which runs in time O(n 3+ 1 ). NSE seeks an arbitrary stable matching whose sex-equality cost lies within some range. However, we may want to find a good one if there are several solutions in the range. In fact, there is an instance I that has two stable matchings M and M such that
c(M ) (see Section 4). This motivates us to consider the following corresponding optimization problem Minimum Egalitarian Sex-Equal stable marriage problem (MinESE): given a stable marriage instance I and a positive constant , find a stable matching M that minimizes c(M) under the condition that |d(M)| ≤ , (or the answer "None" if none exists). We show that MinESE is strongly NP-hard, and give a polynomial time (2 − ( − δ)/(2 + 3 ))-approximation algorithm for an arbitrary δ such that 0 < δ < , whose running time is O(n 3+2( 1.2. RELATED RESULTS. As mentioned above, the minimum regret stable marriage problem and the minimum egalitarian stable marriage problem can be solved in polynomial time [Gusfield 1987; Irving et al. 1987; Gusfield and Irving 1989 ], but the sex-equal stable marriage problem is strongly NP-hard [Kato 1993 ]. Romero-Medina [2001] provided an (exponential-time) algorithm for finding an optimal solution for the sex-equal stable marriage problem. If we allow ties in preference lists, all these problems become hard, even to approximate, if we seek an optimal weakly stable matching: for each problem, there exists a positive constant δ such that there is no polynomial-time approximation algorithm with approximation ratio δn unless P=NP [Halldórsson et al. 2003 ].
Rotation Poset
In this section, we explain a rotation poset (partially-ordered set), originally defined in Irving and Leather [1986] , which is an underlying structure of stable matchings. Here, we give only a brief sketch necessary for understanding the algorithms given later. Readers can refer to Gusfield and Irving [1989] for further details.
We fix an instance I . Let M be a stable matching for I . For each such M, we can associate a reduced list, which is obtained from the original preference lists by removing entries. One property of the reduced list associated with M is that, in M, each man is matched with the first woman in the reduced list, and each woman is matched with the last man. A rotation exposed in M is an ordered list of pairs ρ = (m 0 , w 0 ), (m 1 , w 1 ), . . . , (m r −1 , w r −1 ) such that, for every i (0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1), m i and w i are matched in M, and w i+1 is at the second position in m i 's reduced list, where i + 1 is taken modulo r . There exists at least one rotation for any stable matching except for the woman-optimal stable matching M z .
For a stable matching M and a rotation ρ = (m 0 , w 0 ), (m 1 , w 1 ), . . . , (m r −1 , w r −1 ) exposed in M, eliminating ρ from M means to move m i 's partner from w i down to w i+1 for each i (0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1), (and to update a reduced list accordingly). Note that, by eliminating a rotation, men become worse off while women become better off. The resulting matching is denoted by M/ρ. It is well known that M/ρ is also stable for I . If a rotation σ is exposed in M/ρ, then we can similarly obtain another stable matching by eliminating σ . Now, let M be the set of all stable matchings for I , and be the set of rotations ρ such that ρ is exposed in some stable matching in M. Then, it is known that | | ≤ n 2 . The rotation poset ( , ≺), which is uniquely determined for instance I , is the set with a partial order ≺ defined for elements in . For two rotations ρ 1 and ρ 2 in , ρ 1 ≺ ρ 2 intuitively means that ρ 1 must be eliminated before ρ 2 , or ρ 2 is never exposed until ρ 1 is eliminated. It is known that a compact representation of the rotation poset can be constructed in O(n 2 ) time. A closed subset R of the rotation poset ( , ≺) is a subset of such that if ρ ∈ R and ρ ≺ ρ then ρ ∈ R. There is a one-to-one correspondence between M and the set of closed subsets of ( , ≺): let R be a closed subset. Starting from the man-optimal stable matching M 0 , if we eliminate all rotations in R successively in any order following ≺, then we can obtain a stable matching. Conversely, any stable matching can be obtained by this procedure for some closed subset. We denote the stable matching corresponding to a closed subset R by M R . For simplicity, we sometimes write c(R) and d(R) instead of c(M R ) and d(M R ), respectively. In particular, the empty subset corresponds to the man-optimal stable matching M 0 , and the set itself corresponds to the woman-optimal stable matching M z . From M 0 , if we eliminate all rotations according to the order ≺, then we eventually reach M z .
For a rotation ρ = (m 0 , w 0 ), (m 1 , w 1 ), . . . , (m r −1 , w r −1 ), we define w c (ρ) and w d (ρ), which represent the cost changes with respect to the egalitarian and sex-equality measures, respectively, by eliminating ρ:
Here, note that w d (ρ) > 0 for all ρ since by eliminating a rotation, some men become worse off, some women become better off, and other people remain matched with the same partners. Now, let ρ be a rotation exposed in a stable matching M. Then, it is obvious from the definition that c(
. Also, it is easy to see that for any closed subset R,
Hence, the minimum egalitarian stable marriage problem (the sex-equal stable marriage problem, respectively) is equivalent to the problem of finding a closed subset R such that c(
is minimum. For example, the algorithm for finding a minimum egalitarian stable matching in Irving et al. [1987] efficiently finds such R by exploiting network flow.
The Sex-Equal Stable Marriage Problem
Recall that M 0 is the man-optimal stable matching and M z is the woman-optimal stable matching. Note that any stable matching
In the following, we assume without loss of generality that |d(M 0 )| ≤ |d(M z )|, since otherwise we can exchange the roles of men and women. Hence,
We first briefly give the underlying idea of our algorithm presented in this section. Recall that, for a given instance I and , we are to find a stable matching M such that
As an easy case, assume that all rotations ρ of I satisfy w d (ρ) ≤ 2 . Now, we construct the rotation poset ( , ≺) of I , and starting from M 0 , we eliminate rotations in an order of any linear extension of ≺.
Recall that by eliminating a rotation, the sex-equality cost increases, but by at most 2 by assumption.
, and recall that, if we eliminate all rotations from M 0 , we eventually reach M z . Then, in this sequence, we certainly meet a desirable stable matching at some point.
However, this procedure fails if there is a rotation with large sex-equality cost: if we eliminate such a rotation, then we may "jump" from M to M such that
there is a feasible solution. To resolve this problem, we will try all combinations of selecting such "large" rotations, and treat "small" rotations in the above manner. To evaluate the time complexity, we show that the number of large rotations used in a feasible solution is limited. Before giving a description of our algorithm, we define our notation. Let R be any (not necessarily closed) subset of a poset ( , ≺). Intuitively speaking, when constructing a closed subset A, if we decide to include all elements of R to A, then R min is the set of elements that must be included in A. Similarly, if we decide to include no elements of R, then R max is the set of elements that must not be included in A. 
, then the algorithm answers "None." Otherwise, suppose that there is a stable matching
Step 3 as R, and we consider this particular execution of Step 3.
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Step 3(a). Therefore,
Step 3(c) is closed. For this, it suffices to show that R min ∪ {ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . . , ρ k } is closed. Suppose that it is not closed. Then, since R min is closed by definition, there are rotations
Steps 1 and 2 can be performed in O(n 2 ). Inside the loop of Step 3 can be performed in O(n 2 ) since the number of rotations is at most O(n 2 ). Clearly, Step 4 can be performed in constant time.
We consider the number of repetitions of Step 3, that is, the number of R satisfying the condition at Step 3. Let this number be t. Recall that the number of rotations is at most n 2 as mentioned in Section 2. Therefore,
Hence the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n
Remark 1. The Partially Ordered Knapsack problem (POK) [Johnson and Niemi 1983; Kolliopoulos and Steiner 2007] is the Knapsack problem with the following additional constraints. There is a precedence relation between items, and items must be selected according to this relation. Once the rotation poset is constructed, the sex-equal stable marriage problem is essentially the same as a special case of POK, denoted UPOK, where every item has the same profit and weight. Very recently, Bonsma [2007] , independently of us, proposed a PTAS for a special case of UPOK using the same idea as Algorithm 1.
Remark 2. We can improve Algorithm 1 when |d(M 0 )| and |d(M z )| are close, more precisely, when they differ by at most a log n factor. Let be 1 log n max{|d(M 0 )|, |d(M z )|}. We can find a stable matching M which satisfies − ≤ d(M) ≤ or report that none exists in polynomial time by using a modified version of Algorithm 1 (Algorithm 1 ). We modify Algorithm 1 so that it uses instead of and executes
Step 3 for all subsets of 2 R L . Note that, from the discussion in Section 2, Remark 3. There are several goodness measures of an approximation algorithm A for a minimization problem. The usual measure is the approximation ratio of A, which is defined as max{A(x)/opt(x)} over all instances x, where opt(x) and A(x) are the costs of the optimal and the algorithm's solutions, respectively. However, this measure cannot be used for the sex-equal stable marriage problem, because opt(x) can be zero. For such a case, there is another measure: the relative accuracy [Charikar and Wirth 2004; Nesterov 1998 ], which is defined as max{(max(x) − opt(x))/(max(x)− A(x))} over all instances x, where opt(x), max(x), and A(x) are the costs of the optimal solution, the worst solution, and the algorithm's solution, respectively. By using Algorithm 1 in Remark 2, we can construct an algorithm T which achieves the relative accuracy 1 + / log n for an arbitrary constant > 0.
To see this, let M opt be an optimal solution for the sex-equal stable marriage problem. Recall that we are considering the case where 
It is easy to see that the maximal closed subset which does not contain ρ H corresponds to M a and that the minimal closed subset which contains ρ H corresponds to M b . Therefore, M a and M b can be obtained in polynomial time. Finally, assume that |d(M opt )| ≤ D/2. For each i such that i = 1, 2, . . . , log n , we can find a stable matching with sex-equality cost between − 2 log n Di and 2 log n Di if any by using Algorithm 1 (by adjusting appropriately), and output the best one. Then, it is easy to see that an output matching M satisfies |d(M)| − |d(M opt )| ≤ 2 log n D. Now, the relative accuracy is
The Minimum Egalitarian Sex-Equal Stable Marriage Problem
In NSE, we are asked to find a stable matching whose sex-equality cost is in some range close to zero. However, if there are several stable matchings satisfying the condition, there might be good ones and bad ones. In fact, there is an instance I that has two stable matchings M and M whose sex-equality costs are the same (zero), but whose egalitarian costs are significantly different. Instance I is constructed with the following steps. First consider the following instance I 1 consisting of 2n men and 2n women: 
If a preference list is not complete, then add any missing persons at the tail of the list in an arbitrary order. Instance I 1 has two stable matchings:
Let I 2 be the instance obtained from I 1 by exchanging men and women.
Let I be the instance obtained by putting I 1 and I 2 together and padding the missing persons at the tail of the preference lists to make them complete. In more detail, the set of men of I is the union of the sets of men in I 1 and I 2 , and the set of women of I is similarly defined. The preference list of a man m in I who came from I 1 is constructed by adding the women in I 2 in an arbitrary order to the tail of the list of m in I 1 . The preference lists of the other people are constructed similarly. Then, I has four stable matchings M 3 , M 4 , M 5 , and M 6 , whose egalitarian costs and sex-equality costs are given in Table I . We see that
This motivates us to consider the following problem, MinESE (the Minimum Egalitarian Sex-Equal stable marriage problem): given an instance I and a constant such that 0 < < 1, find a stable matching M with minimum c(M), under the condition that |d(M)| ≤ , (or answer "None" if no such solution exists). First, in Section 4.1, we show that MinESE is strongly NP-hard. Then, in Section 4.2, we give an approximation algorithm for MinESE.
STRONGLY NP-HARDNESS OF MINESE. It turns out that there is a polynomial-time algorithm for obtaining a stable matching
is minimum. Interestingly, it is hard to obtain M satisfying (a) and (b).
THEOREM 4.1. MinESE is strongly NP-hard.
PROOF. We will prove the theorem by a reduction from the clique problem. First, we give the definition of the clique problem.
The clique problem
Input: A graph G(V, E) and a positive integer k. Output: "Yes," if G(V, E) has a clique of size k. "No," otherwise.
This problem is NP-complete even if we restrict the problem so that G is d-regular
2 . This can be seen, for example, in the following way: given G = (V, E), define d as the smallest even number that satisfies d ≥ max{ (G), 2k 2 +1}, where (G) is the maximum degree of G. Let V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n }, and for each In the following, we assume that the given graph has the above property, that is, d-regular with d > 2k 2 . First, we construct a poset from the clique problem. Given a graph G = (V, E) and an integer k, we construct a poset ( , ≺) in a similar manner as the construction used in [Johnson and Niemi 1983] . Let be V ∪ E ∪ {ρ + }, where ρ + is an additional element. Define the precedence relation ≺ as follows: ρ + ≺ v for all v ∈ V , and v ≺ e if and only if v ∈ V is incident to e ∈ E in G(V, E). Then, ρ + has outdegree |V |, each element v ∈ V has outdegree d and indegree 1, and each element e ∈ E has indegree 2. Note that, to construct a nonempty closed subset, we need to choose ρ + , and, if we select k elements from V , we can take at most k(k − 1)/2 elements from E.
Next, we construct a MinESE instance I from the poset ( , ≺) obtained by this construction. We first construct I from ( , ≺) using the same construction as in Gusfield et al. [1987] and Kato [1993] . In the following, we give a brief explanation how the instance I is constructed.
-Construct a poset ( , ≺ ) from ( , ≺) by adding a new element s that precedes all elements in , and another new element t that succeeds all elements in . -Rename elements of as ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . . , ρ h (h = | |), so that the order ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . . , ρ h is a linear extension of ≺; in other words, for all i and j, if ρ i ≺ ρ j then i < j. -Let {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e F } be the set of edges of the Hasse diagram H ( ) of ( , ≺ ). Associated with each edge e i , create a man m i and a woman w i . There will be F men and F women in total. Condition (2) has already been satisfied. The two conditions (1) and (3) can be satisfied by padding "dummy" persons in the preference lists as in Kato [1993] (1)- (3), we pad (dummy) men to the top of the women's lists.) The resulting instance of MinESE is (I , ). Note that these constructions can be done in polynomial time. It is easy to check that in the instance
We will show that G has a k-clique if and only if there is a stable matching M in
If this is true, we can show that MinESE is strongly NP-hard as follows: given an instance G of the clique problem, we construct a MinESE instance I and by the above reduction. Then, we find an optimal solution M and the man-optimal stable matching M 0 .
Finally, we compare c(M) and c(M
, then the answer to the clique problem is "Yes"; otherwise, it is "No."
We first show the "only if" part. Suppose that G has a k-clique C. In the rotation poset of I , let R be the set of rotations corresponding to k vertices and k(k − 1)/2 edges of C. Then, R = R ∪ {ρ + } is a closed subset. Then, it is easy to see that the corresponding stable matching M R is a required solution:
(the last equality is from Equation (1)).
We now show the "if" part. Let M be any stable matching of I such that
, and R be the set of rotations of I corresponding to M. First, note that R contains ρ + , since, otherwise, R = ∅ and so
Let v M and e M be the numbers of the rotations in R which correspond to elements in V and E, respectively. Then,
, again contradicting the assumption. Thus, e M = k(k − 1)/2 and v M = k. Therefore, the vertices and the edges in R correspond to a k-clique of G.
Remark 4. Note that the reduction in the NP-hardness proof produces an instance (I, ) of MinESE such that |d(M 0 )| = |d(M z )| in I , and is any constant such that 0 < < 1. Observe that, if |d(M 0 )| = |d(M z )| and = 1, then MinESE is equivalent to the minimum egalitarian stable marriage problem, which can be solved in polynomial time.
APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS FOR MINESE.
Here, we give a (2 − ( − δ)/(2 + 3 ))-approximation algorithm for MinESE for an arbitrary δ such that 0 < δ < . Similarly to Section 3, we assume that |d(M 0 )| ≤ |d(M z )|. We begin by stating two simple but important results that link the egalitarian cost and the sex-equality cost; their proofs are given later. (i) For any stable matching M, |d(M)| < c(M) (Lemma 4.4). (ii) For any stable matching M and a rotation ρ exposed in M, by eliminating ρ from M, the cost change with respect to the egalitarian measure is less than the cost change with respect to the sex-equality measure (Lemma 4.5).
FIG. 3. C < B by (i) and A < C by (ii). Hence
To illustrate the basic idea of the algorithm, we first consider a restricted case and show that our algorithm achieves a 2-approximation. For a fixed δ such that > δ > 0, suppose that all of the rotations satisfy w d (ρ) ≤ δ . Given I and , we first find a minimum egalitarian stable matching M eg , which can be done in polynomial time. 
However, we may have rotations of large costs. Then we take a similar approach as in Section 3: let R L be the set of such large rotations. Then, for any partition R 1 and R 2 of R L (R 1 ∪ R 2 = R L and R 1 ∩ R 2 = ∅), we want to obtain a minimum egalitarian stable matching whose corresponding closed subset A contains all of the rotations in R 1 but none in R 2 . For this purpose, we need to solve the following problem.
Instance. An instance I of the stable marriage problem, and its disjoint subsets of rotations R 1 and R 2 , both of which are subsets of R L . Feasible solution. A closed subset A such that A ⊇ R 1 and A ∩ R 2 = ∅.
Optimization criteria. Minimize the egalitarian cost of the stable matching M A corresponding to A.
For this problem, we can use the same algorithm for the minimum egalitarian stable marriage problem in Gusfield and Irving [1989] . We denote this procedure by minEgalitarian(R 1 , R 2 ). First, we review the following proposition. PROPOSITION 4.2 (FEDER 1992 , 1994 . Given a poset ( , ≺), there is an O(n 3 )-time algorithm which finds a minimum-weight closed subset of ( , ≺) with respect to the egalitarian cost.
Our procedure minEgalitarian(R 1 , R 2 ) is as follows: without loss of generality, assume that there are no elements such that r 2 ≺ r 1 (r 1 ∈ R 1 and r 2 ∈ R 2 ) since there exists no solution in such a case. Construct the poset ( , ≺) by removing all of the rotations in (R 1 ) min and (R 2 ) max from ( , ≺) (recall the definitions of R min and R max given before Algorithm 1), and let R be the subset obtained by applying Proposition 4.2 to ( , ≺). Then, it is easy to see that (R 1 ) min ∪ R is an optimal solution for minEgalitarian(R 1 , R 2 ). Now, we are ready to give the algorithm for MinESE.
Algorithm 2 1. Construct the rotation poset (
Fix an arbitrary order ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . . , ρ k which is consistent with ≺, where
. . , ρ i }, exit this for-loop and go to (c).
Else if d(A) >
, do the following. Fix an arbitrary order ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . . , ρ k which is consistent with ≺, where , then the algorithm answers "None." Otherwise, suppose that there is a feasible solution, and let M opt be an optimal solution. We first show that Algorithm 2 finds a feasible solution. Let OPT be the rotation set corresponding to M opt , and define 
Next, we analyze the approximation ratio. Let M * be the matching found in this particular execution of Step 4. We show that c(M
, which gives us a proof for the approximation ratio. We first prove the following two lemmas. Steps 1, 2, 3, and 5 can be executed in O(n 2 ) time.
Step 4(a) is performed in time O(n 3 ) by Proposition 4.2. We can see that Steps 4(b) and 4(c) can be performed in time O(n 2 ) by a similar analysis of Algorithm 1. The number of repetitions of
Step 4 can be analyzed in the same way as for the proof of Theorem 3.1, which is O(n 2( 1+ δ ) ). Hence the time complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(n 3+2( 1+ δ ) ).
Concluding Remarks
In this article, we gave a polynomial time algorithm for finding near optimal sex-equal stable matching. Furthermore, we proved strongly NP-hardness and developed a polynomial time approximation algorithm whose approximation ratio is less than 2 for MinESE. Our future work is to improve the approximation ratio of MinESE.
